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JUROR SAFETY:
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND
MEANINGFUL VOIR DIRE IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS-
ARE THEY ENDANGERED SPECIES?
ABRAHAM ABRAMOVSKY*
INTRODUCTION
T HE presumption of innocence and the right to trial by an impar-
tial jury have long been hallmarks of the American criminal
justice system. Recently, however, these cherished doctrines have
been substantially restricted. In Bell v. Wolfish,' for example, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the presumption of
innocence has no application to a determination of the rights of
pre-trial detainees. 2 In Kentucky v. Whorton,3 the Court held that a
charge addressing the presumption of innocence need not always be
given to a jury prior to its deliberations. 4
These cases followed landmark Court decisions which had eroded a
defendant's right to a jury trial. In Williams v. Florida, 5 the number
of jurors deemed essential to a fair trial was lowered by the Court's
holding that a twelve person jury is not constitutionally mandated. 0
The requirement of a unanimous verdict, which heretofore was
deemed essential to assure that a defendant's guilt be established
beyond a reasonable doubt, was abandoned by the Court in Apodaca
v. Oregon.7
Such decisions have stripped the presumption of innocence and
right to a jury trial of much of their vitality. Still, the trend continues.
The latest step, this time under the banner of "Juror Privacy," was
taken by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Barnes.8 The court in Barnes upheld a trial judge's sua sponte in-
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1967, Queens
College, New York; J.D. 1970, State University of New York at Buffalo; LL.M. 1971,
J.S.D. 1976, Columbia University School of Law. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Kathryn Keneally, Fordham University School of Law, 1982, for her
assistance in research and editing. The author also wishes to thank Matthew Kauf-
man.
1. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
2. Id. at 533.
3. 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
4. Id. at 789.
5. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
6. Id. at 86.
7. 406 U.S. 404, 410-12 (1972). See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362
(1972).
8. 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
30
MEANINGFUL VOIR DIRE
struction to potential jurors not to reveal their identities and his
preclusion of defense counsel from inquiring on voir dire as to a juror's
street address, and religious and ethnic background." In so holding,
the court not only further derogated a defendant's right to a jury trial
by substantially restricting the scope and meaning of voir dire, but
dealt a devastating blow to the presumption of innocence before a
scintilla of evidence was introduced against the defendant at trial.
Part I of this Article examines the presumption of innocence, begin-
ning with the significant role it has traditionally occupied in the
American criminal justice system, and tracing its erosion in several
recent Supreme Court decisions to its almost complete evisceration in
Barnes. Part II analyzes a line of cases which has substantially limited
the scope and extent of voir dire. Contending that many defense-ori-
ented jurors are excluded in the early stages of jury selection'0 and
that the prosecution often has access to relevant information about
prospective jurors which is unavailable to defendants," it is suggested
that any curtailment of voir dire has a disproportionately adverse
effect on the defendant. Part III examines the novel doctrine of "Juror
Privacy" formulated by the Second Circuit in Barnes, and concludes
that it is unsupported by legal precedent. Nevertheless, it is conceded
that threats to juror safety by, or on behalf of, the defendant or some
disenchanted segment of the public pose a substantial danger both to
the individual jurors involved and the jury system as a whole. It is
suggested, therefore, that where the prosecution establishes by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the safety of jurors is likely to be
imperiled, a number of precautionary measures short of anonymity be
utilized by trial judges. Thus, Part IV provides an analysis of alterna-
tives available to safeguard jurors from physical harm while concomi-
tantly assuring those accused of a crime a fair trial.
I. THE PRuEUPrION OF INNOCENCE
The presumption of innocence has long been perceived as an essen-
tial element of the American criminal justice system. As late as 1976,
both conservative and liberal members of the Supreme Court of the
United States' 2 reiterated the paramount role of the presumption in
the adjudicatory stage of a proceeding. For example, in Estelle v.
9. 604 F.2d at 137.
10. See infra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. In the often cited decision,
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895), the Supreme Court of the United States
stated: The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused
is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law." Id. at 453.
12. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 502, 515 (1976) (separate opinions of
Burger, C.J., and Brennan, J.).
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Williams,13 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated that
the right to a fair trial is "a fundamental liberty secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment .... The presumption of innocence, al-
though not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a
fair trial under our system of criminal justice."' 4  In his dissent,
Justice Brennan elevated the presumption of innocence to constitu-
tional heights when he stated:
One of the essential due process safeguards that attends the accused
at his trial is the benefit of the presumption of innocence .... This
presumption of innocence is given concrete substance by the due
process requirement that imposes on the prosecution the burden of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.';
Even Justice Rhenquist, while holding that the presumption of inno-
cence does not apply to pretrial detainees, reiterated its importance in
the adjudicatory stage of the proceeding when, in Bell v. Wolfish,' 0 he
stated:
The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the bur-
den of proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as an admonish-
ment to the jury to judge an accused's guilt or innocence solely on
the evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis of suspicions that
may arise from the fact of his arrest, indictment, or custody, or
from other matters not introduced as proof at trial .... Without
question, the presumption of innocence plays an important role in
our criminal justice system.17
At the same time, however, the Court has placed a number of sub-
stantive limitations on this most significant doctrine.
The first limitation was delineated by the Supreme Court in Bell v.
Wolfish.' 8 Wolfish was a class action brought by pre-trial detainees
challenging the constitutionality of such conditions of custody as
"double bunking,"' the "Publisher's only rule,' 20 the prohibition of
receiving food packages from the outside,2 and body cavity searches
after contact visits. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, pre-trial de-
tainees could "be subjected to only those 'restrictions and privations'
13. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
14. Id. at 503.
15. Id. at 517-18.
16. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
17. Id. at 533.
18. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
19. The confinement of two inmates in a cell designed for one. Id. at 526.
20. This rule limited receipt of books to those from the original publishers only.
Id. at 528. As a result of this rule, a pre-trial detainee could not receive books from
his family or friends.
21. This rule prohibits special foods such as kosher meals for Jewish detainees and
pork-free meals for Black Muslims.
[Vol. 50
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which inhere in their confinement itself or which are justified by
compelling necessities of jail administration.' "-22 In reversing the
Second Circuit and holding the practices constitutional, the Supreme
Court stated:
Our fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals is that
we fail to find a source in the Constitution for its compelling-neces-
sity standard.... [T]he presumption of innocence provides no
support for such a rule .... [I]t has no application to a determina-
tion of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before
his trial has even begun. -2 3
The next substantive limitation was formulated by the Court in
Kentucky v. Whorton.2 4 In Whorton, the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky overturned a conviction on the grounds that the trial judge had
failed to include the presumption of innocence in his charge to the
jury.25 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding
that the failure to give such an instruction did not, in and of itself,
violate the constitution. Rather, whether such a violation had oc-
curred could only be determined "in light of the totality of circum-
stances" 26 surrounding the judge's omission.
22. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Rhem v.
Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974)), re'd, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); accord
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 142 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In its decision, the
court of appeals reversed the district court decision, Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp.
114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), that enjoined these practices on a number of constitutional
grounds.
23. 441 U.S. 520, 532-33 (1979). The Court reiterated the importance of the
presumption of innocence at trial, but stated: "[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with
due process of law .... Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention
amounts to 'punishment' in the constitutional sense, however. Once the Government
has exercised its conceded authority to detain a person pending trial, it obviously is
entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention ...
[a]bsent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility
officials .... Id. at 535, 537-38 (footnotes omitted).
24. 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
25. Id. at 787.
26. Id. at 789-90. The decision in Whorton was somewhat surprising since, just a
year earlier, the Court, in Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978), reversed a
conviction where the trial judge, while instructing the jury that the prosecution bore
the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, refused to
instruct the jury that the defendant was presumed innocent and that the indictment
was of no probative value. The Court stated that an ordinary citizen might be
unfamiliar with the presumption of innocence and the requirement to prove a
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that it was therefore necessary to
impress jurors with their significance. Id. at 483-85. The Court apparently concluded
that a presumption of innocence instruction, especially if requested by counsel, was
mandated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 490. In
Kentucky v. Whorton, this interpretation was rejected.
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In the span of one year, therefore, the Court held that the cherished
presumption was inapplicable to pre-trial detainees, and that, under
certain circumstances, an instruction concerning its application and
existence could be omitted at the end of the adjudicatory process.
Fortunately the Court in Whorton did reiterate that the presumption
remained of paramount importance to our system of criminal justice.
In United States v. Barnes, 2 7 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has further imperiled the vitality and effectiveness of the
presumption. Under the rationale utilized by the court in Barnes, the
damage occurs at the inception of the adjudication, thereby tainting
the entire fact-finding process. This rationale, if followed by federal
and state courts, would further exacerbate the recent Supreme Court
assault on the presumption of innocence.
In Barnes, eleven defendants, including alleged kingpin Leroy
"Nicky" Barnes, were convicted after a ten week jury trial of conspir-
acy to violate the federal narcotics laws.2 8 On appeal, the defendants
challenged, inter alia, the trial judge's sua sponte refusal on the eve of
trial to permit questioning during voir dire concerning the names,
street addresses, ethnic and religious backgrounds of potential petit
jurors as having deprived defendants of their right to an impartial jury
trial. While conceding that counsel is not always entitled to voir dire
prospective jurors regarding their ethnic and religious backgrounds, 9
the defendants maintained that, at the very least, prospective jurors
should have been required to disclose their neighborhood or township
within a county. In the alternative, appellants maintained that even
assuming the names and addresses had been properly withheld, the
court should have at least inquired into a prospective juror's ethnic
and religious background in order to facilitate the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges. 30 The thrust of appellants' argument was that the
cumulative effect of the restrictions imposed by the trial judge, while
knowing that the jury would be sequestered, was to deprive the
defendants of due process of law. The Second Circuit, in affirming the
convictions, held that
there is neither statutory nor constitutional law that requires disclo-
sure of information about jurors unrelated to any issue as to which
prejudices may prevent an impartial verdict. Nor has any case been
brought to our attention that casts any doubt on the procedure
followed by the trial judge in this case. Since the court gave counsel
full opportunity for an intelligent exercise of challenges by inquir-
27. 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1980).
28. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b) (1) (a), 846 (1976).




ing into the essentials of the case at hand, appellants were not
deprived of any trial right which would require a new trial.3'
While the court apparently felt counsel was provided an adequate
voir dire, 32 this Article contends that the permitted questioning was
insufficient to reveal prejudices which might have prevented an im-
partial verdict. 33
Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Second Circuit's decision
in Barnes, however, is the devastating blow dealt to the presumption
of innocence. In effect, by his instruction with respect to anonymity,
the trial judge implied that the defendants were so vicious and dan-
gerous that anonymity was required to protect the jurors and their
families from harassment, physical injury, or even death. In an), prior
jury service, the jurors would not have been instructed to remain
anonymous. Therefore the only reasonable inference that a juror
could draw from the judge's instruction was that protection was
mandated by the character of the defendant. It would have been
ludicrous for a juror to conclude that he was being protected from
members of the United States Attorney's office, their investigators, or
from the judge himself. Thus, before any evidence -,vas introduced in
the narcotics prosecution, the defendants were depicted by implica-
tion as notorious individuals. This characterization, without any
proof by the government of any conspiracy to tamper with the jury,
let alone any actual attempts to do so, eviscerated the presumption of
innocence to which these defendants were entitled.34
The difference in the rationale underlying the trial court's decision
and that of the Second Circuit is noteworthy. The government did not
request anonymity and consequently must be presumed to have deter-
mined that such a request was not necessary. The trial court's sua
sponte imposition of anonymity was partly prompted by the wish to
protect the jurors' privacy from interference by the media.35  The
31. Id. at 143 (footnotes omitted).
32. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
33. See infra pts. II D, E, F and G.
34. Judge Meskill, who dissented in Barnes, correctly noted: "[The majority
opinion is itself substantial evidence of how difficult it might have been for the jurors
to resist an inference as to the 'real' reason for the decisions regarding juror names,
addresses, and sequestration. The [majority] opinion is based largely on the 'sordid'
and all-too-often violent history of multi-defendant narcotics trials in the Southern
District and [reaches] the conclusion that the safety of the jurors and their families
would have been in serious jeopardy but for measures guaranteeing juror anonym-
ity." 604 F.2d at 168 n.4.
35. During the trial when one of the defense attorneys suggested that, based on
the sequestration order and the restriction regarding names and addresses, jurors
would infer the "real" reason for the judge's decisions, namely, that he believed that
the jurors and their families would be endangered by serving on the jury, Judge
Werker responded: "It has nothing to do with any real reason. I just do not want
them interfered with, their privacy interfered with." Id. at 168 n.4. Moreover, when
1981]
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majority of the court of appeals, however, explicitly stated that the
"sordid history" of narcotics trials in the Southern District "was suffi-
cient [in and of itself] to put the trial court on notice that all safety
measures ... including complete anonymity [should be em-
ployed]. ' 36  Concern for the privacy of the jurors was, at best, a
secondary consideration and appears to have been much less impor-
tant to the court of appeals than to the district court judge.37 That the
majority viewed the anonymity requirement as a necessary device to
protect jurors and their families from dangerous, hardened criminals
is made crystal clear in its statement that
[a]ppellate judges, from the comparative security of their ivory
towers, are not burdened, as was this trial judge (and, indeed, as
are all trial judges), with the responsibility of providing for the
protection of the jurors, witnesses, and counsel. It can be no an-
swer that no untoward event had occurred up to the opening of the
trial. The trial judge had to take such steps as might be necessary in
advance to avoid such an event. Cases need not be cited to prove
the adage of the futility of locking the barn door after the horse has
escaped.38
This reasoning does not comport with the long prevailing tradition
that a defendant, no matter how notorious or unpopular, is cloaked
with a presumption of innocence which can only be removed if and
when the prosecution proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In
effect, the majority concluded that a judge can determine the degree
of danger posed by a defendant and relate his feelings to the jury by
affirmatively requiring them to remain anonymous. The total absence
of any evidence of jury tampering, or of a conspiracy to tamper,
injure, or otherwise adversely affect a juror was specifically held to be
irrelevant. In effect, the court created a presumption that defendants
in major narcotics trials pose a grave danger to jurors and their
families. As a practical matter this forces a defendant to testify, for
the only effective way he can even partially rebut such a presumption
is by taking the stand to rehabilitate his own character.
the judge actually instructed the jury not to disclose their names and addresses and
informed them that they would be sequestered during the course of the trial, he
stated: "I think the jurors are entitled to their privacy and I think their families are
entitled to their privacy." Id. at 168. Thus, at least in part, the trial judge's ruling
was based on the likelihood of extensive publicity regarding the trial and the possibil-
ity that the media would attempt to interview members of the jurors' families. Id. at
136-37.
36. Id. at 134-35.
37. The majority stated: "In addition, their rights of privacy had to be respected
. ... Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 137 (footnote omitted). It is unclear what the majority had in mind in
providing protection for counsel. Which counsel? Defense attorneys? They did not
seem to be overly concerned. Prosecutors? They did not seek any protection, nor
display any fear. Does the future bode anonymity of prosecutors?
[Vol. 50
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The majority continued its assault on the presumption of innocence
by concluding that
[i]f a juror feels that he and his family may be subjected to violence
or death at the hands of a defendant or his friends, how can his
judgment be as free and impartial as the Constitution requires? If
'the anonymous juror feels less pressure' as the result of anonym-
ity, . ..this is as it should be-a factor contributing to his imparti-
ality. The court's decision as to anonymity and sequestration com-
ported with its obligation to protect the jury, to assure its privacy,
and to avoid all possible mental blocks against impartiality....
Fear of retaliation against themselves or members of their families
would inevitably have been uppermost in their minds during their
deliberations. Sequestration would have been no protection in the
event of a guilty verdict. 39
The majority conveniently disregarded the fact that no showing was
made that any juror would have felt threatened in the absence of the
sua sponte ruling of the trial judge. The prosecution did not raise the
issue, nor did any juror during voir dire express such concern.
Ironically, it may well be that the sua sponte instruction instituted a
fear that the jurors prior to the instructions had never entertained.
Instances abound where jurors, after having their names and ad-
dresses revealed in open court, promptly proceeded to convict some of
the most notorious criminals in our history. Many of these convictions
were secured in the Southern District.40
The procedures utilized in the Barnes case deprived the defendants
of a fair trial in that they were not accorded their axiomatic and
elementary right to be presumed innocent at the commencement of
the proceedings against them. The characterization of defendants as
a source of danger to the jurors was based therefore on "suspicions
* . .from other matters not introduced as proof at trial." 4' The de-
fendants were, in effect, charged with crimes not included in the
indictment and bore the burden of disproving that they were individ-
uals who would engage in such conduct.
39. Id. at 140-41 (emphasis added).
40. E.g., Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427 (1943) (homicide trial of Murder
Inc.'s "Lipke" Buchalter); United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 40S (2d Cir. 1960)
(conspiracy prosecution of Apalachin defendants); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201 (2d Cir. 1950) (insurrection trial of Eugene Dennis), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951);
United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Mitchell-Stans prose-
cutions); People v. Crimmins, 26 N.Y.2d 319 (1970) (homicide prosecution of Alice
Crimmins); People v. Luciano, 277 N.Y. 348 (compulsory prosecution trial of "Lucky
Luciano"), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 620 (1938).
41. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). Consideration of such matters was
specifically prohibited in Wolfish as a result of the Court's holding that a jury must
determine the accused's guilt or innocence based solely on the evidence adduced at
trial.
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In Estelle v. Williams, 42 a case that preceded Barnes by three years,
a majority of the Court had recognized that the presumption of
innocence could be diluted by innuendo, and, therefore, had in-
structed trial courts to be aware of, and to avoid, overly suggestive
statements. 43 Thus, in Barnes, the trial judge was under a duty to
evaluate the likely effect of his anonymity ruling on a jury "based on
reason, principle, and common human experiences."" The possibil-
ity, therefore, that an average juror could draw the inference that
anonymity was utilized to protect his well-being and that of his family
so imperils the presumption of innocence as to preclude the use of
anonymity at trial.45 As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Wil-
liams,
42. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
43. Justice Burger, writing the opinion, stated: "To implement the presumption,
courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact finding
process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against
dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The actual impact of a particular practice on tile
judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined. But this Court has left no
doubt that the probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close
judicial scrutiny. . . . Courts must do the best they can to evaluate the likely effects
of a particular procedure based on reason, principle, and common human experi-
ence." Id. at 503-04 (citations omitted). He then concluded that: "The potential
effects of presenting an accused before the jury in prison attire need not . . . be
measured in the abstract. Courts have, with few exceptions, determined that an
accused should not be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the
possible impairment of the presumption so basic to the adversary system. . . . This is
a recognition that the constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such
distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror's judgment." Id. at 504-05 (footnotes
omitted).
44. Id. at 504.
45. Moreover, in Estelle v. Williams, the majority formulated an equal protec-
tion standard that is pertinent to the facts in Barnes. The Court reasoned: "Similarly
troubling is the fact that compelling the accused to stand trial in jail garb operates
usually against only those who cannot post bail prior to trial. . . . To impose the
condition on one category of defendants, over objection, would be repugnant to the
concept of equal justice embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 505-06.
This standard was not adhered to in the Barnes case. To impose anonymity in
multi-defendant narcotics prosecutions, but not in other serious criminal cases, con-
stitutes a violation of equal protection of the laws. This violation is compounded by
the fact that jurors often serve in other cases prior to serving in a narcotics case.
When a juror has previously served in a trial in which his anonymity was not
required, and which ended the prior day or even the same morning, his awareness of
the anonymity requirement in the present case, and the inferences it carries, is
heightened, and the rights of the accused substantially derogated. Moreover, unlike
the prison garb cases, no possible benefit issues to a defendant from juror anonymity.
While in Estelle, the Court required compulsion for reversal since "cases show . ..
that it is not an uncommon defense tactic to produce the defendant in jail clothes in
the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury." Id. at 508. Jury anonymity is not likely
to constitute a defense tactic.
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[t]he prejudice may only be subtle and jurors may not even be
conscious of its deadly impact, but in a system in which ever%
person is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt, the Due Process Clause forbids toleration of the risk.
Jurors required by the presumption of innocence to accept the
accused as a peer, an individual like themselves who is innocent
until proved guilty, may well see [a person who deserves to be
convicted].46
Moreover, the methods by which anonymity is achieved create an
atmosphere that would substantially derogate the defendant's right to
an impartial jury trial.
II. THE RIGHT TO A JuRY TRIAL
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." 47  In the landmark
case of Duncan v. Louisiana,48 the Supreme Court of the United
States found that the jury trial guarantees of the sixth amendment are
fundamental rights made applicable to defendants in criminal cases in
state courts via the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.49 The Court noted that the framers of the Constitution sought
to prevent governmental oppression by placing a lay jury as a buffer
between the defendant and the state. This buffer acts as an "inestima-
ble safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge."O5
46. Id. at 518-19.
47. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
48. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
49. Id. at 149.
50. Id. at 156. Noting that it was the right to a jury trial and not the exercise
thereof which acted as the safeguard, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
accepting a waiver of this right. Id. at 158. The expansive tone set in Duncan was not
matched by a subsequent series of Supreme Court decisions. In 1970, the Court
began to define the sort of jury guaranteed to a defendant in state criminal proceed-
ings. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Court held that a state criminaljury need not be composed of twelve members and specifically found that a jury of six
persons did not violate the defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment jury trial
guarantees. Id. at 86. The Court also established a functional standard for its
subsequent right to jury trial cases. Citing Duncan, it concluded that a jury should be
so large as to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation,
and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross section of the
community. Id. at 100. It concluded that a jury of six was sufficient to perform its
function with no significant differences in the safeguarding and decision making
processes from a jury of twelve. The Court in Williams did not set a minimum
number of jurors; it merely noted in a footnote that "six is above [the] minimum." Id.
at 91 n.28. However, in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), the Court halted the
diminution of jury size, and held that a five member jury would not satisfy the jury
1981]
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A. Voir Dire and the Use of Peremptory Challenges
In their briefs to the Second Circuit, the appellants in United States
v. Barnes5 contended that the voir dire amounted to a "blind man's
bluff" since the anonymity ruling deprived them of the opportunity to
intelligently assess and exercise their peremptory challenges.52 While
counsel for appellants were justifiably concerned about the procedure
utilized, both as it affected these defendants and the criminal justice
system, their claims were somewhat exaggerated. Even though the
right to a jury trial is premised on the notion that every juror should
be fair and impartial, it is no secret that during voir dire both sides
attempt to select the most partial jurors available. Each party seeks to
empanel those jurors most favorable to his point of view. In an effort
to further the possibility of empanelling impartial juries, all state 3
and federal courts allot to both sides an unlimited number of chal-
lenges for cause. 54 Each party is also entitled to a specific number of
trial guarantees of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 241. The Williams
decision also expressly reserved the issues of whether the unanimity of jury verdicts
was an essential feature of the right to trial by jury. Id. at 100 n.46. However, in the
companion cases of Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), and Johnson v. Louisi-
ana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), the Court rejected the argument that a unanimous jury
verdict was mandated by the sixth and fourteenth amendments' requirement of proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and upheld non-unanimous jury verdicts. Id. at
360; Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411-12 (1972). The logical crossroad of the
positions taken by the Court was reached in Burch v. Lousiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979),
in which the Court was faced with a non-unanimous verdict by a six member jury.
The Court, relying on its reasoning in Ballew that five jury members are insufficient
to render a unanimous verdict, held that five members of a six member jury are also
insufficient to render a verdict that satisfies the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Id.
at 139.
51. 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
52. In their petition for rehearing to the Second Circuit, which included the
request for a rehearing en banc, the appellants went further, stating that the court's
opinion was totally unsupported by any authority. Specifically, the appellants as-
serted: "A divided panel of this court affirmed the conviction of [the] defendants in
an extensive opinion of some 100 pages length. In so doing, a divided majority has
ratified a novel-if not strange-rule of law which is totally unsupported by author-
ity from any other circuit, any decision of the United States Supreme Court and
which is unique and totally without precedent in the entire history of American
jurisprudence. It has sanctioned-for the first time in American legal history-the
trial of a defendant in a criminal prosecution before an 'anonymous' petit jury. A jury
that was empanelled without the names, identities or residence locales being revealed
to counsel during the course of the trial court's voir dire and one that was empanelled
without permitting counsel to make any inquiry whatsoever, in light of their ano-
nymity into the individual juror's ethnic or religious background." Brief for Appel-
lants at 2-3, United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 907 (1980).
53. See C. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures 282-84 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Van Dyke].
54. Id. at 140.
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peremptory challenges,55 whereby counsel can excuse those jurors who
appear biased in favor of his adversary.-"
The utilization of peremptory challenges is based on the realization
that many jurors, although ostensibly impartial, may in fact harbor
biases toward one of the parties. Ironically, on certain occasions even
those jurors who, in preliminary questioning, have asserted their im-
partiality should be peremptorily challenged. For example, let us
assume that David Berkowitz, the infamous "Son of Sam" killer, was
tried in New York City.57 Imagine the reaction of the lawyers in the
case if a potential juror consistently replied in the negative when
asked in voir dire whether he had heard of, read about, or discussed
the case with his family or friends. While legally the juror would be
deemed impartial and thus not subject to a challenge for cause, a
person who has lived in a city gripped by fear and has yet managed to
insulate himself from it completely would be viewed as a social ascetic
at best and a walking cadaver at worst. Without being subject to
peremptory challenge, however, this individual, so obviously out of
touch with his surroundings, would become one of the "sole judges of
the facts."
Some circuits in the past have upheld the right of a trial judge not to
disclose names and addresses of potential jurors. Other decisions have
affirmed trial court rulings which denied counsel the right to inquire
about the religious and ethnic backgrounds during voir dire. The
Barnes decision was unprecedented in foreclosing counsel from inquir-
ing into each of these areas in the same case. Nevertheless, the jury
was not completely anonymous. The trial judge did examine each
juror extensively on other aspects of his background, as well as his
perceptions on certain issues vital to the case at bar. For example,
55. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b). If the offense is punishable by death, each side has
twenty peremptory challenges. If the offense is punishable by more than one year
imprisonment, the prosecution has six and the defense ten peremptory challenges. If
the offense is punishable by less than one year imprisonment or by fine or both, each
side has three peremptory challenges. Id. State laws vary widely concerning the
number of peremptory challenges. Ordinarily, both parties have the same number of
challenges, but twenty states allow more challenges to the defense than the prosecu-
tion. See Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 282-84.
56. As early as 1894, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the
paramount importance of this right: "The right to challenge a given number of jurors
without showing cause is one of the most important of the rights secured to the
accused .... He may, if he chooses, peremptorily challenge 'on his own dislike
without showing any cause;' he may exercise that right without reason . . . any
system for the empaneling of a jury that . .. embarrasses the full, unrestricted
exercise by the accused of that right, must be condemned." Pointer v. United States,
151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
57. In fact, David Berkowitz pled guilty to murder in the second degree and was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
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each juror was questioned concerning his family history,58 education,
the county where he resided and his length of residence, his occupa-
tion, 59 and membership in any organized group, club, or fraternal
organization. Moreover, prospective jurors were asked "whether they
had any feelings about undercover agents, paid informants, or elec-
tronic surveillance which would prevent their fair judgment of the
case"; whether they had seen or read anything in the media which
would prevent their fair consideration of the case; whether they
worked for the government; and whether they had an opinion about
the courts, defense lawyers, prosecutors and law enforcement officers
which would prevent them from being impartial.00 They were also
questioned in depth concerning their attitudes towards blacks, includ-
ing such inquiries as "whether [they] had ever moved to a different
area because [they] had been disturbed by changing conditions,"'"
and whether they "had ever had any experiences with persons of
different races arising out of employment, residence, or school situa-
tions."'6 2 On the basis of these and the usual boiler plate questions,"3
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court
conducted a voir dire which gave defense counsel full opportunity to
intelligently exercise their peremptory challenges. 4 Apparently, the
court was persuaded that the voir dire left the defense and the prose-
cution on equal footing.
58. Jurors were questioned concerning their marital status and whether they had
any children. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 135 (1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 907 (1980).
59. Jurors were also asked the occupations of their spouses and children. Id. at
135.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 136.
62. Id. Examples of specific questions asked of potential jurors included: "'Can
you tell us what your general attitude is toward black people?'; 'Have you had any
experience with any member of any race, creed or color other than your own which
has resulted in any kind of civil or criminal confrontation in any court of law?'; 'Have
you had any experience at your place of employment or residence or school which
would make you feel you could not fairly judge a person of a different race, creed or
color?'; 'Are you in general prejudiced against persons of another race, creed or color
so you feel that you could not fairly consider and decide this case on the evidence?"
Id. at 136 n.4. (citation omitted).
63. These questions included: whether the jury knew any of the participants
involved, including defendants, attorneys, or other individuals and businesses which
would be mentioned at the trial; whether they could accept and apply the law as
instructed by the judge; whether they would be available during a lengthy trial;
whether they had previously served on juries; whether they were ever charged with a
crime or subject to subpoena, whether they had dealings with the DEA or other
police agencies dealing with narcotics detection; whether they or close friends or
relatives had any prior experience with narcotics or firearms; whether they had
previous knowledge of the indictment or had read anything about the case. Id. at
135-36.
64. The court stated: "[T]he [trial] court conducted a voir dire which resulted in
the selection of a panel whose background was fully explored, and whose state of
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B. Peremptory Challenges - Are Both Parties On
Equal Footing At the Commencement of Voir Dire?
The Supreme Court has held that the jury selection process must
protect the defendant's right to be judged by a jury which represents a
fair "'cross-section of the community."' 6 5 Throughout the process,
however, certain segments of society, especially minorities, the el-
derly, the young, and the poor,6 6 are either totally eliminated, 67 or
underrepresented, in the jury pools. Moreover, those members of
some underrepresented groups who are chosen as veniremen have
physical characteristics that render them subject to challenge based
solely on visual perception. Because the jury selection process alone
will not produce a representative pool, meaningful voir dire is essen-
tial for a defendant to salvage a jury which will reflect a cross-section
of the community. Under the present system, a defense attorney often
finds himself confronted with a petit jury composed of middle-aged,
or retired, middle-class individuals who have little in common with
his client. Rules which restrict voir dire serve to strengthen the posi-
tion of the prosecution.
C. Selection of the Jury Pool
Historically, the jury selection process has often been marred by
discriminatory exclusion of certain groups.68 Responding to this
problem, Congress, in 1968, passed the Jury Selection and Service
Act.6 9 In pursuance of the goal of selecting juries at random from a
mind with respect to the racial 'question' was probed as well." Id. at 136 (footnote
omitted). In arriving at this conclusion the court was undoubtedly influenced by the
fact that five of the jurors chosen were black and one of the alternates was Hispanic.
Id. at 136 n.5.
65. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946) (quoting Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942)); see Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227
(1946).
66. For example, persons who cannot speak or write English may be eliminated
from consideration.
67. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 23-42.
68. See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (women); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (race); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34
(5th Cir. 1966) (same).
69. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. The Act
provides that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in
the district courts of the United States ... on account of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or economic status," 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976), as amended by
Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96417, § 302(a), 94 Stat. 1739 (1980), and




fair cross-section of the community, 70 a master jury list is drawn from
either voter registration lists71 or a list of those citizens who actually
voted in a recent election. From this so-called "wheel," jurors are
called as needed.72 Each district or division may provide, consistent
with the purposes of the Act, exemptions 73 and excuses 74 from jury
duty because of undue hardship. For example, jurors may be excused
on the grounds of undue hardship resulting from travel. 75 Although
the Act is the most signficant recent move toward more representative
federal juries, it falls far short of assuring the defendant that his jury
will be called from a fair cross-section of the community. 70
The difficulties in securing a representative jury at the master list
stage lie in the nearly exclusive use of voter registration lists as the
source of potential jurors. Many of the underrepresented groups tend
70. For the method of jury selection for the Southern District of New York, see
Jury Selection Plan, Southern District of New York (Sept. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
the Plan].
71. The Plan, supra note 70, relies solely on voter registration lists, a practice
which was upheld in United States v. Guzman, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973).
72. The Plan, supra note 70, states that "[1]ists [of prospective jurors] shall not be
made public until the jurors have been summoned and the Chief Judge may order the
names kept confidential if the interests of justice so requires." Id.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1976). The Act mandates exemptions for active members
of the armed forces, police and fire department members and government officials.
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6) (1976).
74. The Plan, supra note 70, allows excuses for persons over 70, active ministers,
women with legal custody of a child under twelve, practicing lawyers, law students,
physicians, dentists, registered nurses, teachers and administrators in public or pri-
vate schools or colleges, sole proprietors of businesses, and "persons as to whom the
Chief Judge finds ... that jury service would constitute undue hardship or extreme
inconvenience." Id.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (6)(7) (1976). The Plan, supra note 70, allows the excuse
from jury service of persons residing more than 50 miles from the courthouse.
76. Despite the Act's mandate, many segments of society remain vastly underrep-
resented in jury pools. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 23-42. In a 1971
federal district court survey, blue collar workers were underrepresented on juries In
four-fifths of the districts. Id. at 25. These figures take on added significance in view
of a 1973 study demonstrating that the likelihood that jurors would convict increases
as the disparity in the socioeconomic status between the jurors and the accused
increases. Id. at 27 (citing Adler, Socioeconomic Factorg Influencing Jury Verdicts, 3
N.Y.U. Rev. Law and Soc. Change 1 (1973)). In federal district court surveys taken
in 1971 and 1974, 77.1% of the available 166 surveys showed an underrepresentation
of non-white persons in districts where non-white population was four percent or
more; in over half of the districts surveyed, underrepresentation of non-whites was at
20% or more. Id. at 28. Underrepresentation of the young and the elderly is univer-
sal throughout the federal district courts. Id. at 35. Women, despite a commonly
held belief of overrepresentation on juries due to greater availability, are generally
underrepresented, according to the 1971 and 1974 studies. Women who appeared forjury duty were underrepresented in 88.9% of 234 surveyed courts. Id. at 39.
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to register to vote at a rate far below the national norm. 77 The Act
does require voter registration lists to be supplemented with addi-
tional source lists when the purposes of the Act are not being ful-
filled.78  The courts, however, remain largely unmoved by the argu-
ment that strict dependence upon voter lists is faulty and that multiple
source lists should be utilized. 9 Instead, courts have tended to lay
fault with the citizen who fails to register to vote.80
Furthermore, the federal courts have been particularly reluctant to
find the existence of underrepresented "cognizable groups" in the
categories of age, education and economic status. 8' The rationale
relied upon by the courts in denying the cognizability of these groups
is that these segments of the population are too difficult to identify
without drawing arbitrary distinctions, and that even within identi-
fied groups there exists a gamut of attitudinal shadings that are con-
trary to the distinctive identifying features of a "cognizable group."82
Such reasoning does not take into account the arbitrariness present
throughout the process of jury selection, including the congressional
decision to use voter registration lists as the primary and often sole
source of federal jury pools.
77. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 88-89.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1976).
79. See, e.g., Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate
For Multiple Source Lists, 65 Calif. L. Rev. 776 (1977).
80. One court reasoned: "The fact that some persons may from religious con-
science or otherwise choose not to register to vote does not, in our view, convert that
subclass of nonvoters into a 'cognizable group.' " Camp v. United States, 413 F.2d
419, 421 (5th Cir.), (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 (1969). Another
court stated: "Congress intended the voter registration lists to serve an important
screening function by eliminating those individuals 'who are either unqualified to
vote or insufficiently interested in the world about them to do so.' " United States v.
Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), (quoting
1968 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 1795-96). See also United States v. Cuzman,
468 F.2d 1245, 1248 (2d Cir. 1972) (voting lists need only be supplemented where
obstacles are placed in the paths of certain citizens attempting to register to vote),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973); Camp v. United States, 413 F.2d 419, 421 (5th
Cir.) (Jehovah's Witnesses), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968 (1969).
81. Although underrepresentation by virtue of economic status is violative of the
Act on its face, 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976), as amended by Custom Courts Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 302(a), 94 Stat. 1739 (1980), courts have been unwilling to
classify the unemployed, or food stamp recipients, as cognizable groups. United
States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1977) (unemployed); United States v.
McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. La. 1973) (food stamp recipients), afJ'd sub nom.
United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975).
82. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (age); United States
v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977) (age, education); United States v. Kirk, 534
F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1976) (age) cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v.
Olson, 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973); United
States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972);
United States v. Kuhn, 441 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1971) (same).
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The courts' refusal to find the existence of clearly cognizable groups
on the basis of age, education or economic status is unwarranted. For
example, a recent study has indicated that young adults share a
distinct set of attitudes that are more highly correlative than attitudes
shared by members of accepted cognizable groups.8 3 Yet courts per-
sist in finding cognizable groups based solely upon race, sex, occupa-
tion or income. To date only one federal case has recognized young
adults as a cognizable group . 4
Even when the federal courts define a segment of society as a
"cognizable group," thereby assuring representation in the jury pools,
there remains the hurdle of establishing that this cognizable group
was sufficiently underrepresented in the jury pool as compared with
its numbers in the local population so as to violate the Act. Jury pools
are not required to be statistical mirrors of the community,- nor is a
criminal defendant entitled to a proportionate number of members of
his race either on the rolls from which the jury is selected or on the
petit jury that tries him.86  In order to successfully challenge jury
selection procedures, a defendant must either show systematic exclu-
sion of an identifiable class or demonstrate that there is a "substantial
deviation" from the group's representation in the jury pool and its
share of the population. 7  The existence of a "substantial deviation"
in violation of the Act is established not through a comparison of the
percentage of the group in the jury pool and the percentage of the
group in the local community, but by determining whether a different
jury selection procedure would have changed the number of members
of a given class within the jury pool.88 Granting trial courts such
discretion allows jury selection procedures in many districts to circum-
vent the purposes of the Act and results in unrepresentative jury
venires.89
83. Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 76 Mich. L.
Rev. 1045, 1077 (1978).
84. United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570 (.st Cir. 1970). The court also
recognized the cognizability of the less educated. Id. at 571.
85. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); United States v. Di Tommasso,
405 F.2d 385, 389 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969); Rabinowitz v.
United States, 366 F.2d 34, 57 (5th Cir. 1966).
86. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); United States v. Freeman, 514
F.2d 171, 173 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Noah, 475 F.2d 688, 697 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1095 (1973); United States v. Gonzalez, 456 F.2d 1067, 1068
(9th Cir. 1972).
87. United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1074 (1979).
88. United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Di Tommasso, 405
F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969).
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The goal of a representative jury is dealt another blow in the second
stage of jury selection, where prospective jurors may be excused from
service. Excusal may occur at any one of two points in the selection
procedure: after the prospective juror responds to a questionnaire sent
on the basis of his selection from the "master wheel"; or on the day
that the prospective juror is called and arrives at court.20 The Act
directs each district, in formulating its jury selection plan, to delineate
which occupational groups should be excused so that its members do
not suffer "undue hardship or extreme inconvenience" resulting from
jury service. 91 Congress has not specified what particular groups
might be excused for hardship reasons, but has left the issue to the
determination of the trial judge, subject to the district's selection
plan.92 Unfortunately, this usually results in an unrepresentative jury
because "most courts accommodate those who do not want to
serve." 93 Courts often assume that the young, the aged, women and
blue collar workers will be inconvenienced by jury service and excuse
proportionately more jurors from these groups. This higher rate of
excusal frequently impedes the goal of representative juries.94
Neither Congress, through the Act, nor the courts, since the Act's
passage, have effectively addressed the goal of assuring proportion-
ately representative juries. Voir dire, the final step in jury selection,
affords a defense attorney an opportunity to correct some of the
representation problems created by the two prior stages. By informed
exercise of both peremptory challenges and challenges for cause, the
defense may be able to bring a jury's composition more proportionally
in line with the local community. 5
D. Selection of the Petit Junj
Meaningful peremptory challenges must be based on thorough
questioning of potential jurors. Limiting inquiry to broad questions
such as "Can you give this defendant a fair trial?" will not suffice to
discern bias or prejudice. Thus, the major issue is the breadth of the
inquiry. Critical to the resolution of this issue is whether both sides are
on an equal footing with respect to the composition of the pool and
90. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 111.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(5) (1976).
92. Congress has only stated that "'[s]uch groups might include, among others,
doctors, ministers, sole proprietors of businesses, and mothers of young children.
Members of excused groups could serve if they desired to do so, but a request for an
excuse must be granted." Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 127 (citing S. Rep. No. 891,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1967)).
93. Id. at 112.
94. Id.
95. In certain cases, he may even increase the representation of some groups




the information concerning members of the pool available to each
side. As seen in the previous section, the jury pool selection process
often benefits the prosecution. In the course of a trial, information
available to the prosecution but not the defense further impedes the
possibility of an impartial jury. In Barnes, the court of appeals as-
sumed that the parties were equally affected by the trial court's rul-
ings. 96 Past cases, especially those involving notorious defendants,
render this assumption questionable.
For example, in the prosecution of mobster Frank Costello for
federal income tax evasion, the chief prosecutor requested an Internal
Revenue agent to check the returns of all veniremen. The reason given
for this request was "to find out whether any of the prospective jurors
had income tax troubles of their own or had other reasons to be
unfavorably disposed to the government. '9 7 The inspection resulted
in the compilation of information concerning the taxpayers' occupa-
tions, sources of income and all unusual deductions. This data was
utilized by the prosecution to more intelligently exercise its peremp-
tory challenges. 8  Appealing the conviction, the defendant con-
tended that (1) he was tried by a jury which was specially condi-
tioned to find him guilty, and (2) that it was fundamentally unfair to
permit the government, for the purpose of exercising its peremptory
challenges, to use information which was not available to this defend-
ant and would not be available to even the wealthiest of defendants.
In sanctioning the government's conduct in the case, the court relied
on Best v. United States,99 and Christoffel v. United States, 10 wherein
the appellate courts upheld the district courts' refusals to permit de-
fendants the opportunity to review F.B.I. profile reports on prospec-
tive jurors to which the prosecution had access. 10 In 1970, in United
States v. Falange,"'2 the government, in the exercise of its peremptory
challenges, used information about potential jurors which it had ob-
tained from the F.B.I., state and local police, and even the local
credit bureaus. The Second Circuit approved of this practice, holding
that the district court did not err in denying a defense motion to
withdraw the jury.
Both parties, therefore, do not conduct voir dire on the basis of
equal information. Procedures adopted by the prosecution and sanc-
96. United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 142 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 907 (1980).
97. United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
937 (1958).
98. Id.
99. 184 F.2d 131, 141 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1951).
100. 171 F.2d 1004, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 84
(1949).
101. See also Martin v. United States, 266 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1959).
102. 426 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970).
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tioned by the courts place the prosecution well ahead in the race to
empanel a favorable jury.
E. Securing Names and Addresses During Voir Dire
While in theory one juror is as impartial as another, in reality jurors
are influenced by their own ethnic and religious backgrounds. Fur-
thermore, the perception of a juror will often vary with his economic
status, place of residence, and the customs and mores which are
prevalent in his everyday existence. Increasingly, courts have candidly
acknowledged the importance of the socioeconomic background of the
jurors. A case in point is Alvarado v. State. 0 3
In Alvarado, the appellant contended that since all of the prospec-
tive jurors lived within fifteen miles of the city of Anchorage, residents
of native villages located beyond the fifteen mile limit were unconsti-
tutionally excluded. In reversing the defendant's conviction on the
ground that he did not receive an impartial jury trial and was thereby
denied his constitutional right to due process of law, the court stated:
[The] evidence vividly portrays the enormous gulf which separates
the mode of life of the typical Alaskan villager from the type of
existence led by most residents of Anchorage and other cities of the
state. The differences between a Native village and the City of
Anchorage are neither simple nor superficial; they are not re-
stricted to a single element such as occupation or income. Rather,
the lines of separation are profound and intersect areas including
occupation, economy, domestic relations, politics, language, reli-
gion, race, cultural heritage, and geography.104
A defendant may prefer, therefore, certain jurors over others de-
pending on the charge, his own background or a given political or
economic climate. The ethnic or religious background of a juror can
frequently be ascertained through his name. Although not scientifi-
cally accurate, this method is simple and often reliable. In Barnes,05
by instructing the jurors not to identify themselves by name, the trial
court even precluded the use of this basic source of information. This
obstruction was aggravated further by the court's refusal to permit
inquiry into the jurors' ethnic 0 6 and religious backgrounds on voir
dire.107 In addition, the defense was precluded from inquiring as to
the jurors' street addresses. The attorneys and their. clients were
thereby denied the ability to assess meaningfully a juror's background
and his perceptions concerning the defendants and the crimes with
which they were charged.
103. 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971).
104. Id. at 899 (footnote omitted).
105. 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
106. See infra pt. II F.
107. See infra pt. II C.
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In districts where one county has a predominantly urban popula-
tion and another a primarily rural one, the name of the county and
the length of residence within that county may be sufficient. This
information is inadequate, however, when questioning jurors drawn
from the Southern District of New York. In the Southern District,
great disparities exist, not only among the counties, but within the
various communities and neighborhoods of each county. For example,
the South Bronx and Riverdale are two neighborhoods located within
Bronx county. It would be fair to say, however, that these areas
constitute "two different worlds" whose populace, wealth, mores and
customs vary substantially. The South Bronx is a squalid area rife with
sickness, addiction, poverty and crime. Gutted buildings, abandoned
automobiles ravaged by scavengers, and other assorted debris adorn
the street. Crime is rampant. 08 Less than ten minutes away by
automobile, however, lies Riverdale, replete with private homes, lux-
ury apartments and gourmet stores. Clearly, the perceptions of the
residents of these areas differ significantly. In Riverdale, a police
officer is viewed as the protector. In the South Bronx, he is viewed as a
symbol of authority whose actions are less than benign. Since the
activities of the defendants in Barnes were alleged to center in Harlem
and the South Bronx, knowledge of where potential jurors resided was
of the utmost importance. The defense may not have chosen only
those jurors who lived amidst urban poverty and excluded those who
lived in affluent neighborhoods, but the nuances inherent in knowl-
edge of a prospective juror's residence would have enabled the defense
to utilize their challenges more intelligently.
Factors beyond a prospective juror's place of residence must also be
considered. For example, some of the younger people who lived in
Harlem and the South Bronx reputedly regarded Nicky Barnes as a
folk hero. Others, especially the elderly, either feared or were actual
victims of the area's astronomical crime rate, much of which has been
attributed to the drug trade and its resulting addicts. Each of these
groups would have an entirely different perception of the defendants
and the charges for which they were prosecuted. Both groups, how-
ever, form their perceptions at least in part as a result of the commu-
nity in which they reside.
Although knowledge of a juror's name is helpful, it is not so com-
pletely informative as to warrant forcing defense counsel to base his
decisions of whether or not to challenge a potential juror solely on that
knowledge. Even if counsel were to surmise correctly that a potential
108. The situation that exists in the South Bronx is typified in the description of
one of its precincts, the 41st. The precinct was once nicknamed "Fort Apache" due to
its epidemic crime rate and the similarity of the area to the wild west. Today, as a
result of arson, vandalism and other forms of destruction, it has been renamed "The
Little House on the Prairie."
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juror was of a particular ethnic background, the information would
be insufficient. There is a great deal of difference between the percep-
tions of an ethnic resident of the suburbs and one who lives in the
inner city. This difference in perception may well carry over to the
adjudication process.
In light of the potential effect of the factors discussed above, a
defendant, in order to exercise his peremptory challenges intelligently,
must know, in addition to name and address, the ethnic and religious
background of each potential juror.
F. Ethnic Background of Potential Jurors
In precluding questions on voir dire regarding a juror's ethnic back-
ground, the trial judge in Barnes said: "'"In my view . . . the law
states that no juror shall be disqualified by reason of race, color or
creed, and in my view of the law he could not be challenged on the
basis of race, color or creed.' "109 While the judge did not identify
any specific statute, apparently he was relying on section 1862 of the
Jury Selection Service Act of 1968.110 Section 1862111 provides: "No
citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the
district courts of the United States . . . on account of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.""12  If the trial
judge, in fact, relied on this section for his ruling, he clearly erred.
Section 1862, as all of the Jury Selection and Service Act, is inapplica-
ble to the voir dire process."13 The Act's purpose is to prevent the
intentional and systematic exclusion of cognizable groups from grand
and petit jury venires. What occurs after voir dire has commenced is
not within its ambit.
In Barnes, the majority of the Second Circuit abandoned Judge
Werker's rationale. Unfortunately, it substituted a novel and extreme
rationale of its own. The majority concluded that the ethnic back-
109. 604 F.2d at 168.
110. Id. at 168.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976).
112. Id.
113. This point was clearly delineated in the recent decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Price, 573 F.2d 356, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1978),
where the court stated: "[T]he [Jury Selection and Service] Act does not encompass
voir dire of the jury panel .... Notwithstanding the broad discretion reposed in the
trial court in conducting voir dire, it is nevertheless certain that voir dire is not within
the ambit of the Jury Selection and Service Act. . . . [B]y its very terms, 28 U.S.C. §
1867(a) provides that challenges on the ground of substantial failure to comply with
the provisions of the title in selecting grand or petit jury shall be made before the voir
dire examination begins, or within seven days after the defendant discovered or could
have discovered, by the exercise of diligence, the grounds therefor, whichever is
earlier ... .' "It is obvious that the commencement of voir dire is the cut-off point fhr
challenges under the Act. Hence, objections to the conduct of the voir dire examina-
tion cannot be included within the terms of the Act. Id. (emphasis in original).
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ground of jurors is irrelevant since no ethnic group looks favorably
upon the sale of drugs or the use of firearms.' 4  The court did not
address, or perhaps decided to ignore, both social science studies and
respected legal foldore which have demonstrated that certain ethnic
groups are traditionally favored by the defense."15
It should be noted that, depending on the times and the specific
issues in the case, lawyers, often assisted by teams of social scientists,
have opted for members of different ethnic groups. Social science
techniques have been successfully utilized in such heralded cases as the
Mitchell-Stans conspiracy, the Harrisburg 7, Joan Little, the Attica
Prison riot and the trial of Indian activists in Wounded Knee." 0
While reasonable persons may differ on what ethnic group would be
most favorably disposed toward a defendant in a given case, ethnicity
is clearly an important factor in jury selection.
Even those scholars who have steadfastly opposed the use of social
science or any other data in jury selection recognize that ethnicity can
influence a jury." 7  For example, in The Constitutional Need for
Discovery in Pre-Voir Dire Juror Studies" 8 the author took the posi-
tion that
[t]he use of juror information and studies by prosecutors to secure
biased jurors violates the defendant's fourteenth amendment right
to due process of law and the sixth amendment right to a trial by an
impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the community. It is
also suggested that the use of such means by the defense to secure ajury biased in its favor is a violation of the state's right (and hence
the people's right) to a fair trial by an impartial jury."19
This rationale for circumscribing questions regarding ethnicity during
voir dire differs from that found in the majority opinion in Barnes in
that it does not deny the importance of such an inquiry. To the
114. 604 F.2d at 140.
115. For example, the highly regarded University of Chicago Jury Project has
determined that persons of English and German backgrounds are more likely to favor
the government, while Blacks, Italians, and Slavs are more likely to be defense
oriented. See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Neb. L. Rev. 744,
748 (1959). Another study has demonstrated that Blacks are more likely to acquit on
the grounds of insanity than any other ethnic group. See R. Simon, The Jury and the
Defense of Insanity 111 (1967).
116. See Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 286.
117. See Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on
Petit Juries, 86 Yale L.J. 1715 (1977). In this Note, the author contends ,that an
attorney should be prevented from challenging jurors merely because they are mem-
bers of identifiable groups. See Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Peremp-
tory Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A Valued Common Law Privilege in
69nflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 554 (1977).
.118. See Note, The Constitutional Need for Discovery of Pre-Voir Dire Juror
Studies, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 597 (1976).
119. Id. at 608.
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contrary, the use of ethnicity and its impact on jury selection are
deemed to be so extensive as to violate the Constitution. In Barnes, the
majority could have used this rationale to support the ruling of the
district judge. Instead, it curiously chose to adopt the rather extreme
position that ethnicity was, for all intents and purposes, irrelevant in
the jury selection process.
G. Religious Background of Prospective Jurors
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the influence that religion
may have on a juror's perception of guilt and innocence. In the
landmark case of Swain v. Alabama,'20 the Court stated that
[a]lthough '[t]here is nothing in the Constitution of the United
States which requires the Congress [or the States] to grant peremp-
tory challenges' . . . nonetheless the challenge is 'one of the most
important of the rights secured to the accused,' . . . [and] is . . .
frequently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to
legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, [or]
nationality ... of people summoned for juryj duty.'2'
In affirming the district court's prohibition against questioning po-
tential jurors about their religious beliefs, the majority in Barnes
correctly observed that neither statutory nor constitutional law re-
quires disclosure of religion in voir dire.'2 2 The court, however, did
not account for the recognition given to these factors by the Swain
decision when it concluded that
[a]s to religion, our jury selection system was not designed to
subject prospective jurors to a catechism of their tenets of faith,
whether it be Catholic, Jewish, Protestant or Mohammedan, or to
force them to publicly declare themselves to be atheists. Indeed,
many a juror might have a real doubt as to the particular religious
category into which they could properly place themsel%,es.'2
This reasoning is somewhat perplexing. It is unclear why the majority
characterized ordinary questioning as to the potential jurors' religious
backgrounds as "subjecting jurors to a catechism of their tenets."'12 4
In affirming the ruling of the district court, the majority could have
relied on a number of cases which have held that, unless religion is an
issue in the case, the trial court has wide latitude as to whether to
permit questioning concerning this issue in voir dire. Ordinarily, the
exercise of discretion will be upheld if it comports with the "essential
demands of fairness" in the particular case. 25
120. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
121. Id. at 219-20 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
122. 604 F.2d at 143.
123. Id. at 141.
124. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
125. E.g., Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931); see Yarborough v.
United States, 230 F.2d 56, 63 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956).
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The overwhelming majority of decisions have upheld trial courts'
discretion in precluding questions concerning religion, even when
religion is of significance in a case, due to either the defendant's
membership in an identifiable sect, or the fact that the offense
charged will evoke reactions which are at least partially attributable
to a person's religion. In Hamling v. United States, 20 an obscenity
prosecution, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to
specifically question veniremen as to whether they entertained any
religious beliefs which would affect their impartiality. The Court held
that specific questions were unnecessary when general questions relat-
ing to prospective jurors' views on obscenity were sufficient to elicit
any biases. 127
In an apparent attempt to strike a balance between a defendant's
right to an impartial jury and the juror's right to privacy, the majority
in Barnes decided that a juror's right not to disclose publicly that he is
an atheist outweighs a defendant's right to exercise his peremptory
challenges on the basis of more than a mere hunch or surmise.128 The
court, however, went beyond this policy by expressing a curious con-
cern that a juror may not be aware of his religion. 29 Even in the
unlikely situation that a juror did not know his own religion, the juror
could so indicate, thereby affording the attorneys an opportunity to
draw their own conclusions as to the juror's self-perception, veracity
and character. The majority concluded its newly adopted thesis by
stating:
The suggestions made by appellants as to fields into which they
would roam would, if we were blindly to accept them, lead to ad
126. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
127. Id. at 139-40. See also United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 389-90 (7th
Cir. 1971) (defendant, accused of interfering with selective service operations and
destruction of records, claimed he lacked necessary intent because his acts were
compelled by his religious beliefs); Hoapili v. United States, 395 F.2d 656, 658 n.2
(9th Cir. 1968) (defendant claimed his refusal to be inducted into military service
stemmed from his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 930 (1969);
Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588, 594 (9th Cir. 1967) (obscenity prosecution);
People v. Daily, 157 Cal. App. 2d 649, 651, 321 P.2d 469, 472 (1958) (abortion);
Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 136, 88 A.2d 556, 559-60 (1952) (same); Common-
wealth v. Hall, 369 Mass. 715, 729, 343 N.E.2d 388, 398 (1976) (Defendant was a
Moslem, yet court refused to ask jurors if they knew "who Allah is."); State v. Weiss,
130 N.J.L. 149, 153, 31 A.2d 848, 850-51 (1943) (abortion), aJJ'd per curlain, 131
N.J.L. 228, 35 A.2d 895 (1944). Contra Wasy v. State, 234 Ind. 52, 55, 123 N.E.2d
462, 464 (1955) (abortion); State v. Barnett, 251 Or. 234, 236, 445 P.2d 124, 125
(1968) (same). In this manslaughter prosecution emanating from an abortion, the
court held that it was an abuse of discretion to limit questions regarding prospective
jurors' religious beliefs where the defendant was accused of murder since "[t]here is a
widely accepted belief that certain religious faiths feel more strongly about abortion
than do others." Id. at 236, 445 P.2d at 125.
128. 604 F.2d at 141-42.
129. Id. at 141.
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absurdum ends. If Darrowesque questioning of prospective jurors
were allowed. any semblance of juror privacy would have to be
sacrificed. There is neither statutory nor constitutional law that
requires disclosure of information about jurors unrelated to an'
issue as to which prejudices may prevent an impartial verdict.'
Once again, it is somewhat difficult to ascertain the exact meaning
of the court's statement. What constitutes "Darrowesque question-
ing"? Apparently, it means little more than questioning a potential
juror about his religious background, pursuant to the advice rendered
by Clarence Darrow, who stated: "In criminal cases I prefer Catho-
lics, Episcopalians and Presbyterians to Baptists and Methodists, be-
cause the tenets held and discipline practiced by the latter set higher
standards of human conduct and make them less tolerant of human
frailty." 131
Moreover, in assessing the religious background of jurors, an attor-
ney not only takes into consideration its effect on a defendant directly,
but also its relation to the other participants in the trial. Even if a
juror maintains an unbiased position toward the defendant, his reli-
gious prejudice or preference toward other participants in the trial
may influence his deduction of the facts. Like any other group of
people, jurors are prone to make character assessments which affect
their objectivity. During the trial, they not only weigh the character
of the defendant, but also those of the witnesses, attorneys and judge.
For example, a devout juror of a particular faith may be swayed by
a belief that a prosecutor who shares his faith would not bring charges
against an innocent party. Similarly, such juror, confronted with
conflicting stories from two witnesses, might be likely to give greater
weight to testimony from a member of his own faith. Finally, a judge
who shares a religious affiliation with jurors may be able to rely on
this affiliation, coupled with the reverence a judge is often accorded
by jurors, to shape the verdict of a trial. Consequently, the jurors'
perceptions of and attitudes toward the religion of the prosecutor,
judge and witnesses can be important to the outcome of the case.
While it is not proposed that every potential prejudicial combina-
tion can be eliminated in jury selection, a liberal voir dire with respect
to religious, much the same as with ethnic, background will decrease
the possibility of blatantly prejudiced jurors. Such juror prejudice,
whether directed at the defendant or at other trial participants, could
affect the outcome of the trial and cannot be ignored.
III. "JuRoR's RIGHT TO PmvAcY"
The doctrine of a "juror's right to privacy" relied upon by the
majority in Barnes is novel at best. A review of relevant cases has
130. Id. at 143 (footnote omitted).




revealed that no other court has held that such a right exists. In
support of its newly delineated doctrine, the Barnes majority did cite
a number of cases. 132 An analysis of these cases, however, reveals that
rather than establishing a right to juror privacy, they merely stand for
the proposition that voir dire should be limited to questions which are
reasonably related to the issues in the case. 133 Clearly, there can be
no absolute right of juror privacy, or citizens could simply invoke
their "right to privacy" and refuse to serve as jurors. Moreover, to date
no decision supports the proposition that jurors could refuse, on pri-
vacy grounds, to answer relevant questions on voir dire.
In a further attempt to bolster this newly discovered right, the
majority in Barnes stated: "It can be imagined that, as counsel seek
more and more information to aid in filling the jury box with persons
of a particular type . . . prospective jurors will be less than willing to
serve if they know that inquiry into their essentially private concerns
will be pressed."' 134  However, more than twenty years ago in the
celebrated case of United States v. Costello, 35 the same circuit dis-
missed an identical contention as "farfetched bogies."' 130
Even assuming, arguendo, that the finding of a right to jury pri-
vacy in Barnes has a legal basis, it is difficult to see how a juror's
name, address, religion and ethnic background are "essentially pri-
vate concerns." A juror's name and address are matters of public
record.137  While religion and ethnic background may be deemed
somewhat more private than a person's name, they too are usually a
matter of common knowledge and can often be found on school and
employment applications, including those for civil service positions.
It is submitted that while the Barnes majority used the phrase
"juror privacy," it in fact sought to ensure and enhance "juror safety."
132. 604 F.2d at 140. Cited were: United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1355
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 909 and 434 U.S. 853 (1977); United States v.
Hamling, 481 F.2d 307, 314 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S. 87, 138-40 (1974),
United States v. Workman, 454 F.2d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
857 (1972); Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 936 (1959), and Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 63 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956).
133. See cases listed supra note 132.
134. 604 F.2d at 140.
135. 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958).
136. Id. at 883. Moreover, the Costello court noted that unwillingness to serve is
an unconvincing argument since jury service is mandatory. Id. The one state court
which has addressed the issue has rejected the claim of a juror's right to privacy. In
Lehman v. San Francisco, 80 Cal. App. 3d 309, 145 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1978), the court
rejected a juror's assertion that the release of his name as a prospective juror to the
parties in the case violated his rights to privacy, freedom of association and due
process.
137. Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28, 30 (1975) (defendant has an unqualified
right under the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f) (1976), to inspect
jury lists for preparation of motions challenging compliance with the Act).
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The two doctrines are by no means synonymous. The concept of juror
privacy is a right to secrecy, foreign to the American jury system. By
jeopardizing a meaningful voir dire, it imperils such fundamental
rights as a fair and impartial jury trial and the effective assistance of
counsel. Moreover, it contains the ominous signal of a secretive, in-
quisitorial adjudication rather than the open and public trial upon
which our system of criminal justice is based.
On the other hand, the quest for juror safety is a noble goal. The
jury, as the sole trier of facts, is at the heart of the criminal justice
system. If jurors feel threatened or endangered during the course of
the trial, they may be unable to render an impartial verdict. Nu-
merous safeguards could be adopted to ensure that the verdict ren-
dered is based solely on the evidence adduced at trial and not on any
irrelevant influence or prejudice. Concomitantly, a citizen who serves
on a jury is entitled to expect that neither he nor his family will be
threatened or harmed.
While jury members, or their families, have been verbally threat-
ened from time to time,' 3 reported instances of actual threats or
injury to jurors are rare. Physical injury to a juror has been traced to a
defendant in only one case, United States v. Bentven a.' 3 In the first
Bentvena trial, a mistrial was declared when the jury foreman broke
his back under suspicious circumstances. In the second trial, one of the
defendants entered the jury box pushing and cursing. As a result of
this conduct, he was shackled and gagged.1 40 Furthermore, in some
cases, the danger to the jurors does not originate with the defendants,
but rather with persons or groups who are sympathetic to either side
of a controversial trial. For example, following the verdict in the
McDuffie case' 41 in which four police officers were acquitted of
charges that they murdered a black man, the city of Miami erupted
with rioting. Fearing retaliation, the court took precautions to protect
the jurors. 142  Thus, even though these cases represent a very small
percentage of criminal trials, the possibility of harm to jurors does
exist.
While juror safety is an important concern, protective procedures
must be judiciously utilized. It is suggested that a presumption of
juror safety should prevail unless the prosecution makes a substantive
138. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978)- United
States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965).
139. 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
140. Id. at 918.
141. Los Angeles Times, May 19, 1980, at 16, col. 1.
142. Id. Three members of the six man, all-white jury said their homes were
under police protection. One of the three said his life had been threatened, but he
would not elaborate. Only one juror would allow his name to be used: the others said
they feared for their safety.
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showing of danger. 43  Only where the prosecution can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that juror safety has been threatened
should protective procedures be employed. Requiring a showing of
substantive facts by a preponderance of the evidence would allowjuror protection procedures to be used in those rare instances where
juror safety is genuinely threatened. More importantly, it would en-
sure that neither the presumption of innocence nor a defendant's
constitutionally protected trial rights would be unnecessarily jeopar-
dized.
IV. SUGGESTED PRECAUTIONARY ALTERNATIVES
Once the trial court decides that precautionary procedures are
warranted, a number of options, short of anonymity, are available. It
is recommended that the court employ the least drastic, yet effective,
option.
In deciding which method to employ, the first issue to be resolved is
the source of the danger. When the source of the danger is the defend-
ant or his cohorts, the court could revoke bail and preclude any
visitors other than counsel. Defense counsel would then be given
jurors' names and addresses and permitted to discuss this information
with the defendant, with the proviso that both counsel and the de-
fendant would be precluded from releasing this information to any
other party.
If the trial court concludes that this procedure would be ineffective,
it could choose to reveal the jurors' identities solely to defense counsel
in an in camera proceeding with the instruction that he not discuss
this information with his client or anyone else. While this more strin-
gent alternative impairs the defendant's ability to participate in the
selection of the jury that will try him, it at least affords counsel the
ability to voir dire prospective jurors meaningfully and to exercise
intelligently his peremptory challenges.
There is no doubt that an in camera inspection of juror lists requires
the court to trust counsel's integrity. On occasion, such trust may be
misplaced. Nevertheless, there is precedent for supplying counsel with
sensitive and confidential information by means of in camera hear-
ings. In the past, in camera hearings with defense counsel participat-
ing while the defendant and the public were excluded have been used
in cases involving profiles of airplane hijackers and drug couriers.' 44
Such profiles are compilations of sociological and psychological traits
which are exhibited by would-be hijackers and drug couriers. Obvi-
ously if routine discovery of these profiles were allowed, persons
143. For example, sending threatening letters or making phone calls to jurors or
their families.
144. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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engaged in such illegal activities would alter their conduct and ap-
pearance, thereby rendering the profiles useless. However, where
probable cause for an arrest or search is based on the profile, it is
essential that a defendant be afforded the opportunity to challenge the
validity of the profile or to assert that his characteristics do not fall
within the contours of the profile. In an attempt to balance these
objectives, courts have permitted in camera hearings while enjoining
defense counsel from revealing the contents of the profile. Moreover,
trial judges have sanctioned the in camera release of the identities of,
and information supplied by, confidential informants to defense coun-
sel in the presence of the defendant. 145
It is suggested that a similar procedure designed to permit the
inspection of juror lists, or the actual voir dire of potential jurors, is
warranted. Moreover, such a proceeding poses less danger to potential
jurors than informants. While informants have historically been the
victims of retaliation attempts, 146 jurors have infrequently been sub-
jected to physical harm, or even verbal threats. In addition, infor-
mants are often involved in subsequent cases, thus requiring a contin-
ued reliance on defense counsel's promise to remain silent.147  The
value of jurors' identities, after the adjudication process is complete, is
negligible. Only in those cases where the trial judge believes the
lawyers cannot be trusted, should he preclude questioning concerning
names and street addresses of potential jurors.
Where the source of the danger is someone other than the defen-
dant, the trial judge should limit the dissemination of jurors' names
and addresses to the defendant and his counsel. This could be accom-
plished by not reading the jurors' names in open court 4 or by exclud-
ing the public from the courtroom during the jury selection process.
This alternative is particularly suitable in those instances where the
sources of potential danger to jurors are persons or groups who are
145. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit endorsed this practice in United
States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975), when
it stated: "[R]ather than establishing a fixed rule that either requires or precludes
disclosure of the informant's identity when probable cause is in issue, we hold that
the responsibility for striking the proper balance in each case rests with the trial
judge. In striking that balance the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, can
conduct an in camera hearing to which the defense counsel, but not the defendant, is
admitted." Id. at 729. See also Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 565 F.2d
19, 22 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978).
146. See generally Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 565 F.2d 19, 22
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978).
147. Id. at 24 n.4.
148. Another possibility is the procedure used in United States v. Gurney, 558
F.2d 1202, 1210 n.12 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978). Although in
Gurney many of the veniremen's names were called in open court during the selec-




enraged by the defendant, or are inflamed by a controversial issue
arising during pre-trial proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Rules which unnecessarily or excessively limit voir dire imperil the
presumption of innocence by creating an implication of guilt before
the commencement of trial. Such rules also derogate a defendant's
right to an impartial jury in that defense counsel is already at a
disadvantage in light of both the composition of the jury pool and of
the unique sources of information available to the government. In voir
dire, defense counsel has the final opportunity to affect the composi-
tion of the jury and to assure the defendant his right to an impartial,
representative panel. A meaningful voir dire is, therefore, critical to
the protection of a defendant's rights.
Concomitantly, threats to juror safety, whether emanating from
the defendant or from volatile factions of our society, must be re-
dressed. However, only in those rare cases where the prosecution is
able to show that no effective alternative to anonymity exists should a
trial judge be permitted to severely limit voir dire by withholding the
names and street addresses of prospective jurors from the defense.
